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ABSTRACT
It is sometimes argued that one cannot criticize general equilibrium models on grounds of
equilibrium non-existence. I argue that once problematic treatments of interests and profits in
general equilibrium models are corrected, equilibrium non-existence issues arise again. Uni-
form rate of interest and zero economic profit of firms must hold after corrections, which allow
equilibrium existence for only restricted circumstances. This demonstrates ongoing relevance
of the Cambridge capital controversies.
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1. Introduction
In the conventional treatment of mainstream general equilibrium models (Arrow & Debreu,
1954; McKenzie, 1954), shares of firms that individuals hold are considered to be fixed. One
can see why this has to be - it really does not make sense for agents to trade shares in a model
where all trades happen at a single period, or treated as such. By Arrow and Debreu (1954);
McKenzie (1954), it was established under convexity assumptions that an equilibrium always
exists for these general equilibrium models, sometimes called as Arrow-Debreu models.
The problem arises when we apply or extend static general equilibrium models to dynamic
settings. Can we really say that the static general equilibrium framework can still be used for
dynamic settings just with some tweaks?
The question involved is how we should treat interests, dividends and profits, which tend
to be dynamic questions. Their interconnections are not well-outlined in mainstream macroe-
conomics models, often analyzed in flawed ways. In fact, it would be accurate to say that
modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, widely used in mainstream
macroeconomics, largely brush aside the above question. This paper explores how careful
considerations of these issues, even in simplified settings, resurrect equilibrium non-existence
issues.
We can cast the discussion of the above and below in terms of the Cambridge capital
controversies. (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003) It is true that modern neoclassical economists have
embraced dis-aggregated capital models. This, however, does not mean that they abandoned
uniform rate of interest, as we will see - the point commonly misunderstood. Aggregation
of capital is not necessary for uniform rate of interest, and modern DSGE models, such as
New Keynesian models (Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Evans, 2005; Smets & Wouters, 2007),
largely work under this uniform rate of interest benchmark. This holds true, regardless of
whether firms, their capital or their production functions are aggregated or not. Furthermore,
marginal product theory of capital is back as dis-aggregated form in DSGE models, despite
no capital aggregation. Marginal product of capital forms capital demand function of firms,
while uniform rate of interest comes as an optimization result of capital funding supply side.
From the above, one may form an impression that the Cambridge capital controversies
are about aggregation issues summarized by the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (De-
breu, 1974; Mantel, 1974; Sonnenschein, 1972, 1973), and otherwise, mainstream economics
remains intact. Even for heterodox responses, directions have varied. (Fratini, 2019) Is equi-
librium existence the issue with general equilibrium models, and there are some faults in
understanding the models such that results establishing equilibrium existence (Arrow & De-
breu, 1954; McKenzie, 1954) must be overturned? Or is stability of equilibrium the issue with
general equilibrium models? The focus has largely been on the latter. (Fratini, 2019) But this
does not need to be.
2. Benchmark general equilibrium model
A representative agent general equilibrium model is described. Somewhat surprisingly, this
will be sufficient to prove the point that equilibrium non-existence issues are alive. There is
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no stochastic shock in this model.
2.1. Representative consumer and investor
A representative consumer and investor has the following utility function and the utility max-
imization problem:
max
Ct,Kt+1,Nt
U = max
Ct,Kt+1,Nt
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Nt)
where the present time is t = 0 where decisions are made, Ct is consumption of the only
consumption good at time t, Nt is labor utilized to get wage. The budget constraint at time t
is:
PtCt + Pt [Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt] ≤ WtNt + rtPtKt
where we assume that capital good is same type as consumption good, thus sharing same
price Pt. Investment is It ≡ Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt, where δ represents capital depreciation rate.
rt is the rate of interest on capital andWt is wage level.
2.2. Extending to multiple capital goods: uniform rate of interest
We can extend the above to two capital goods (Kα,Kβ). Modify the budget constraint, without
changing the utility function, as:
PtCt + Pα,t [Kα,t+1 − (1− δα)Kα,t] + Pβ,t [Kβ,t+1 − (1− δβ)Kβ,t]
≤ WtNt + rα,tPα,tKα,t + rβ,tPβ,tKβ,t
with utility maximization now done by controlling Ct,Kα,t+1,Kβ,t+1,Nt. We can solve the
utility maximization problem using the Lagrangian method, assuming price vector is given.
Let λt be Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint at time t in the Lagrangian.
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The resulting first-order conditions obtained for optimization overKα,t+1 andKβ,t+1 are:
λt+1Pα,t+1 [(1− δα) + rα,t+1] = λtPα,t
λt+1Pβ,t+1 [(1− δβ) + rβ,t+1] = λtPβ,t
Re-arranging,
λt
λt+1
=
Pα,t+1
Pα,t
[(1− δα) + rα,t+1] =
Pβ,t+1
Pβ,t
[(1− δβ) + rβ,t+1]
Thus, factoring in price change and depreciation rate, there is uniform rate of interest. It is
easy to see that this generalizes to any n capital goods circumstances.
From now on, I will again assume single capital good that is homogeneous with consump-
tion good.
2.3. Interpreting profits: argument for zero economic profit
The representative firm is now modeled. It maximizes economic profit:
max
Kt,Nt
pit ≡ max
Kt,Nt
[Ptf(Kt, Nt)−WtNt − rtPtKt]
where Yt ≡ Ct + It ≡ f(Kt, Nt) is production function. Optimization results in marginal
product theory:
Wt
Pt
= f ′(Nt), rt = f
′(Kt)
Now the problem. It initially seems that the budget constraint for the representative con-
sumer should rather be, as standard in DSGE and real business cycle literature:
PtCt + Pt [Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt] ≤ WtNt + rtPtKt + pit
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Notice the added profit term. But whether as an agent funding purchase of capital by a firm or
as an agent directly providing capital goods to firms, there is no reason to distinguish profits
and payments due to use of capital. Both cases are rewards of use of capital or funding of
used capital. Thus, the budget constraint should remain as:
PtCt + Pt [Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt] ≤ WtNt + rtPtKt
In such a case, what exactly is economic profit pit of the representative firm? Why is it maxi-
mizing such economic profit? Shouldn’t it maximize rtPtKt instead?
The answer is that a firm follows the following line of thoughts: “While market rate of
interest is rt, shareholders (or capital provider) seek to obtain more interests. The goal of
firms is to generate as much interests as possible. Thus, a firm seeks to maximize what is left
after paying, as market price dictates, wage WtNt and rtKt. This remainder is paid back to
shareholders.”
Since this is competitive economy, providing non-zero economic profit fails - otherwise,
market rate of interest would not be rt. Therefore, pit = 0.
But that comes with a problem. We have same first-order conditions rising out of optimiza-
tion problems regardless of how pit is handled in the budget constraint of the representative
consumer (investor) - as in mainstream DSGE literature or as described here.
Suppose this benchmark general equilibrium model produces a unique equilibrium, with
additional specifications, when the budget constraint of the representative consumer includes
pit. Then this benchmark general equilibrium model should generally have no equilibrium
when the budget constraint does not include pit.
When production function f(Kt, Nt) is f(Kt, Nt) = AtK
α
t N
1−α
t , then there indeed is
zero economic profit, and we see no problem, regardless of how the budget constraint is
considered. However, for other types of production function, we generally do not get zero
economic profit when the budget constraint includes pit. Thus, when the budget constraint is
corrected, there is no equilibrium.
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3. Conclusion
Thus, even in a representative agent general equilibrium model, equilibrium non-existence
issues remain, when we properly treat interests and profits. It is through muddling of logic
about interests and profits or choice of production function that ensures equilibrium exis-
tence in general equilibrium models. We should expect much worse when we move onto
general equilibrium models of multiple heterogeneous consumers (investors) and multiple
capital goods.
Therefore, what remain of the Cambridge capital controversies are not just about instability
of general equilibrium models, where different opinions are possible - the Cambridge capital
controversies can instead be resurrected as being about equilibrium existence. Joan Robinson
and later heterodox economists asked the question of history versus equilibrium in analyz-
ing economies (Lang & Setterfield, 2006), and it becomes more apparent when the general
equilibrium framework is internally difficult to maintain due to prevalence of equilibrium
non-existence.
The Cambridge capital controversies are not resolved - they are only brushed aside, and
revisits of these controversies are bound to occur. (Cohen & Harcourt, 2003)
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